Football: After listening to the advice, I became the strongest free man! - Chapter 392

c392 De Gea’s heroic performance!

This tactic was perfectly demonstrated in Barcelona and Guardiola’s Manchester City at their peak, but it was not successful in Real Madrid. The team not only failed to show a sharp passing and controlling tactic, but also lost its once-good counterattack ability.

During Lopetegui’s period, Real Madrid’s counterattack attack accounted for only 5.01%, ranking second from the bottom in La Liga.

The reason is very simple. This tactic has extremely strict requirements on the players’ sense of position, passing speed and passing accuracy. Real Madrid’s players need a long period of adaptation.

In the early days of La Liga that season, Real Madrid’s passing and controlling tactics were able to show extremely high ball control against weak teams, but they often lost their effect when facing some mid-to-upper-level teams.

Lopetegui greatly advanced Modric’s position, thereby imposing the organization and dispatching tasks in the midfield area on Kroos alone.

We all know that in general, Real Madrid’s midfield trio is backed by Casemiro, and Kroos and Modric are relatively close. The two of them can use delicate ball control skills and tacit small-scale cooperation to maintain the midfield line.

After Modric’s position was raised, the distance between Kroos and him increased, and there was no way to form a small-scale pass similar to the past.

In desperation, Kroos could only dribble the ball forward in an overly risky manner during the game.

This tactical strategy will give the opponent’s midfield a huge space for pressing. Many teams facing Real Madrid will choose to give up the defense of Modric in a short period of time, and gather people to double-team Kroos who is holding the ball.

In such a background environment, Kroos’s slow speed is infinitely exposed. Once he is stuck in the midfield area, not only will the forward line and even the two full-backs who are inserted be unable to get the ball, but it will also give the opponent many counterattack opportunities from the side.

When the opponent steals the ball from Kroos’ feet, he will launch a counterattack along the side. Casemiro, the single defensive midfielder of the White Army, can only leave his defensive position and pull the side to make up for the defense, and the team’s central gap will be exposed again.

On October 28, 2018, Real Madrid lost 1:5 in the Spanish national derby against their arch-rival Barcelona. They dropped to 9th place in the standings, not only far from the top position, but also beginning to have the danger of relegation.

In this context, the top management of Real Madrid Club made a decisive decision to fire Lopetegui on October 31 and hired Santiago Solari instead.

Before serving as the head coach of Real Madrid’s first team, Solari had already had rich coaching experience in Real Madrid’s youth training camp and even the youth team. The club believed that he could more thoroughly understand the current needs of the White Army, so he was promoted to the head coach of Real Madrid’s first team. In addition to his familiarity with the team, Solari’s ability to discover young players is also one of the important reasons why Real Madrid’s top management is willing to promote him.

During his work in Real Madrid’s youth training camp, Solari discovered outstanding young players such as Ashraf, Valverde and Reguilon. At the moment when Real Madrid is gradually entering a new generation, it is indeed very necessary to hire a head coach who can see the potential of young players.

After coming to the first team, Solari first made fine-tuning to the team’s main lineup.

During Lopetegui’s time, he preferred to use No. 20 Asensio as the left winger. The Spanish coach believed that Asensio’s dribbling ability and organizational skills could keep the ball in the front court for a long time, increasing the team’s conduction space.

Solari’s obsession with passing and controlling is far less than Lopetegui’s. After taking office, he denied Asensio’s main position as the left winger, and instead regarded Vinicius, a young player introduced by the club at a high price, as the first choice.

In addition, Solari also realized the various effects of Modric’s position on the hardness of Real Madrid’s midfield interception. He withdrew the Croatian international to a parallel position with Kroos, and Real Madrid’s classic midfield three-man position returned.

In terms of tactics, although Solari denied the slow passing and controlling during Lopetegui’s time, he only made some minor repairs on the basis of his predecessor, and did not completely innovate the tactics of the White Army.

The Argentine coach asked the team to increase the passing speed in the process of advancing from the back to the front, and then deliver the ball to Vinicius and Bale who have speed advantages in a short time.

Solari’s tactics increased the offensive threat of Real Madrid to a certain extent, and also made the team’s position in the standings rise.

Solari led Real Madrid to 4 consecutive victories at the beginning of his tenure, which was the best start for Real Madrid’s head coach.

But what people didn’t expect was that not long after, the Argentine head coach also fell into a “high start and low end” similar to Lopetegui: Solari led Real Madrid to play 32 games in total, and the White Army lost 8 of them.

More importantly, Real Madrid suffered a Waterloo when facing Ajax in the Champions League quarter-finals. They lost 1:4 in the second round at the Bernabeu Stadium. Such a bleak record directly became the fuse for Solari’s dismissal.

After sending Solari away, the Real Madrid executives who had experienced consecutive failures in the selection of head coaches learned from their mistakes and realized the importance of Zidane to the team.

In March 2019, Zidane officially returned to Real Madrid, and he will also shoulder the important task of leading the Galactico to challenge the La Liga and Champions League titles.

Considering that the season was nearing the end when Zidane returned to Real Madrid, the team was already relatively far away from Barcelona at the top of the standings.

Therefore, Zidane, who entered the palace for the second time, has been given a longer period of tactical adjustment period, and he can deduce his ideal tactics and personnel combination in the league in a more relaxed manner.

The Argentine head coach asked the team to increase the passing rate while advancing from back to front, and instead deliver the ball to Vinicius and Bale, who have the advantage of speed, in a short time.

Zidane’s tactical transformation of the ball can be seen from the average points he scored twice in charge of Real Madrid. The French coach averaged 2.28 points per game during his first time coaching Real Madrid; after entering the palace for the second time, this The data dropped to 1.51 points.

After entering the new season, Zidane adopted a combination of new and old personnel selection. However, with Hazard’s injury and Jovic’s decline in form, the French coach gave Vinicius and Rodrygo two More playing time for young players.

Unlike his predecessor, Zidane, who is very familiar with Ronaldo’s technical characteristics, knows that neither Hazard nor Vinicius can replace the Portuguese’s scoring ability. He does not give these wide players overly complicated responsibilities of moving in and outflanking. , but established Benzema as the tactical core of the frontcourt.

If you think about it carefully, Benzema is indeed a very underrated center in today’s football. During Ronaldo’s time at Real Madrid, he has always played the role of a green leaf, and even set an embarrassing record of only 5 goals in the league in a single season.

After Ronaldo left, people discussed Vinicius, Rodrigo, Hazard, and even Mariano, who performed mediocrely, but Benzema was excluded.

Benzema really doesn’t have the ability to take the lead alone?

The answer is of course no. In the past two seasons, he has helped Real Madrid score 57 goals in all competitions, and the total number of goals scored is the highest among the Real Madrid team.

It can be said that Real Madrid’s leading star in the post-Cristiano Ronaldo era is not Hazard, who is worth over 100 million, Modric, who has won the Ballon d’Or, or Ramos, the captain who leads the defense. Benzema is mediocre and always makes headlines for taking the blame.

Both Lopetegui and Solari ignored the importance of Benzema, but Zidane, who once led Real Madrid to glory, recognized the value of the Frenchman.

When he came to the team, he gave Benzema full freedom of movement in the frontcourt, and even did not hesitate to greatly reduce Hazard’s ball-taking space.

At the same time, Real Madrid’s dominant tactics have gradually transformed from the once flashy ground tradition to a more concise attack with efficient football attributes.

In order to score goals, they can lay down their bodies and fight counterattacks, or they can make some seemingly aimless long passes. Of course, they can also use the side crosses that the team is best at.

Real Madrid’s tactical transformation can be clearly reflected from a set of data. They completed 1,577 successful long passes this season, ranking first in La Liga.

You know, Real Madrid only made a total of 2,442 long pass attempts (this data can only rank 11th in La Liga). Their long pass success rate reached an astonishing 64.6%, ranking first in La Liga. Bit.

It is no accident that Real Madrid can achieve such a high long pass success rate. Their long passes are more instigated by Kroos, Ramos and Casemiro. Among them, Kroos is one of the top midfielders in world football today. His long pass success rate reached an astonishing 86%, the highest long pass success rate among all midfielders in La Liga this season.

Ramos and Casemiro are more responsible for defense on the court, but it does not mean that their footwork is not enough to support some difficult long passes.

Ramos has completed 238 successful long passes this season, with a long pass success rate of 73%, the highest success rate among all defenders;

Casemiro has completed a total of 228 successful long passes this season, with a long pass success rate of 71%, ranking 4th among all midfielders (you know, Casemiro’s position is the backcourt waist, his long pass success rate is even higher than many attacking midfielders known for their organization).

With several stable starting points for long passes in the midfield and backfield areas, Vinicius, Rodrygo and others with obvious speed advantages have more space to attack.

Generally speaking, these two players have very good skills at the foot of the ball, but their receiving awareness and running position selection are still a bit immature, so they are not suitable for narrow-range passing tactics.

Once Real Madrid uses some efficient offensive methods with time differences, they will be able to get enough dribbling and acceleration space on the wing, and the excellent passing abilities of Vinicius and Rodrygo will be more reflected from the side.

Some people think that Vinicius’s too fancy dribbling during the game is a bit flashy. In fact, Zidane very much encourages young players to actively show their personal abilities on the wing.

Of course, Vinicius’s breakthrough on the wing is not only to demonstrate his personal abilities, but also to bring effective three-dimensionality to the team’s offense.

As shown above, when the team transfers the ball to the front wing with a fast long pass, Benzema has no way to outflank the center position in time (Benzema is slower).

In this way, there are only two choices before Vinicius:

1. Use personal skills to force an inside shot;

Second, use the technique of the foot to control the ball and wait for the full-back and center forward to outflank.

Generally speaking, Real Madrid’s wingers will not take too risky individual single-handed fights, but prefer to control the ball and wait for their own players to insert.

Such tactical strategies can not only greatly increase the team’s possibility of crossing, but also consume the physical energy of the opponent’s defensive players.

Real Madrid scored a total of 40 goals in the second half this season, only two behind Barcelona.

In contrast, in the first half, they only scored a total of 30 goals, 14 behind Barcelona.

It can be said that Real Madrid’s tactics of being good at mobilizing the opponent’s physical energy greatly increased their chances of scoring in the second half, thus gaining an advantage in the final battle with Barcelona for the championship.

It is undeniable that Real Madrid in the post-C Ronaldo era has experienced a serious decline in performance in the Champions League.

However, the club’s top management is also actively reversing this trend. First of all, they have invested a lot of money in the transfer market for several consecutive seasons, introducing front-court offensive stars such as Hazard, Vinicius, and Rodrigo.

Although these players have not met the expectations of the outside world for various reasons, there is no doubt that as long as they can regain their competitive form and integrate into the team’s tactics, Real Madrid’s frontcourt offensive ability can be effectively improved.

Secondly, all the Real Madrid coaches in the post-C Ronaldo era are clearly aware that it is not easy to find a replacement for the Portuguese superstar, and they have also begun to gradually promote the overall tactical reform of the White Army.

During Lopetegui’s period, the Spanish coach once tried to implant the passing and controlling gene into the Real Madrid lineup, but unfortunately it ended in failure; Solari’s tactics are relatively more flexible. Although he denied Lopetegui’s relatively stubborn passing and controlling tactics, he did not make a comprehensive innovation in Real Madrid’s offensive and defensive system, but only made minor repairs on the original basis.

In the Zidane era, the French meritorious coach gave up the flashy passing and controlling style of play for Real Madrid, and continued to use highly efficient fast offensive tactics.

Today’s Real Madrid can not only play fast transmission with ornamental content in a local area, but also shrink the defense line in time and adopt a more stable defensive counterattack strategy. Overall, Real Madrid is returning to its own correct path under the leadership of Zidane.

But from a more rational point of view, the renewal of a team cannot be completed in a short period of time. Real Madrid may achieve good results in the league, but it will take more time for them to reach the heights they once achieved in the Champions League.

In the history of world football, it is not only the excellent performance of the players on the field that attracts fans, but also the anecdotes off the field that add a lot of brilliance to the football world.

As one of the greatest clubs, their success comes not only from the blessing of outstanding stars, but also from the stable command of the management for decades, and the high perseverance of never giving up in difficult situations, which has shaped a peak in the history of football development that can never be ignored.

Of course, the history of Real Madrid is by no means smooth sailing. Even in the 2010s when they won the Champions League title, the team suffered setbacks in many areas.

There may be mistakes made by the management, and there may be intentional targeting by other teams.

But what fans are more interested in is the long-standing “Real Madrid fax machine incident”.

Younger fans may have gradually forgotten this incident, or even have no impression of it.

After all, from a larger perspective, the Real Madrid fax machine incident has now become more of a joke after dinner. At the time, it had some impact on the development of the club, but generally speaking, these impacts did not affect the team’s future path.

Therefore, the fax machine incident has gradually evolved over the years and has been separated from the football field, and has become more of a fun thing that Real Madrid has encountered in its development history.

Although his form has declined in recent years, it is undeniable that De Gea is still one of the best goalkeepers in world football in the 2010s.

The Spanish goalkeeper made his mark in Atletico Madrid and became the team’s main force in the 10-11 season, playing 49 times for the Colchoneros in various competitions.

On July 1, 2011, Manchester United bought the Spanish international for 25 million euros. Since then, De Gea’s performance in the Premier League has risen rapidly, and he has quickly become one of the world’s top goalkeepers.

De Gea’s heroic performance at Manchester United inevitably attracted the attention of many giants, including Real Madrid, which was in urgent need of a goalkeeper.

Before the embarrassing butter hands at the 2018 World Cup, De Gea’s professionalism had always been exemplary. He was regarded as the most stable goalkeeper in Spain after Casillas. He also experienced the test of many major events at Manchester United, and both his professional skills and psychological quality were further improved.

At that time, Real Madrid had sufficient goalkeeper reserves. Navas, who joined the team in the summer window of the 2014-15 season, performed outstandingly and played impeccably in the goalkeeper position.

But Real Madrid at that time never gave up looking for a richer goalkeeper combination. Navas alone seemed unable to meet their requirements for the depth of the lineup.

Against this background, Real Madrid’s top management and Manchester United launched several rounds of negotiations in the summer of 2015, with the goal of bringing in De Gea, a world-class goalkeeper.